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Community Planning
In City of Yonkers v. Rentways, IwC. 45 the court merely re-
capitulated established law regarding non-conforming uses under
zoning ordinances. 46 In the instant case, the defendant Rentways
had constructed a two story building in a business zoned lot.
Access to the second story of the building was gained over an
adjoining, higher-level lot which was in a residential district. The
court held that such use of the lot in the residential district was
a non-residential use which the City could enjoin.47 The City is not
estopped 4s from enforcing the zoning laws either because Rentways
had been issued a permit,49 or by laches because the City has
neglected to enforce the zoning laws for many years.5 0
XI. PROP ERTY
A. Real Property
Easements
An easement is the limited use or enjoyment of an interest
in land possessed 'by another.' To create an easement by pre-
scription, there must be adverse use of the privilege or enjoyment
with the knowledge of the person against whom it is claimed, or
such an open, notorious, and uninterrupted use that knowledge
will be presumed. This use must be exercised under a claim of
right adverse to the owner and acquiesced in by him for a period
equal at least to that prescribed by the statute of limitations for
acquiring title to land by adverse possession." While easements
are regulated by the common-law, adverse possession, on the other
hand, is controlled by statute and is defined as the open and hostile
possession of land, under claim of title to the exclusion of the true
owner, which if continued for fifteen years,3 ripens into actual
title."
45. 304 N. Y. 499, 109 N. E. 2d 597 (19S2).
46. See 8 McQurLLAN, M uNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 25.180 et seq. (3rd ed. 1949):
1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAc-ricE §§ 147 et seq. (2d ed. 1953).
47. Village of Great Neck Estates v. Bernak & Lehman, 223 App. Div. 853, 228
N. Y. Supp. 917 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 248 N. Y. 651, 162 N. E. 562 (1928).
48. See 8 MCQULI.AN, op. cit. supra, note 46 § 25.153; 1 YOKLFY, op. cit. supra
note 46 § 109.
49. City of Buffalo v. Roadway Transit Co., 303 N. Y. 453, 463 104 N. E. 2d 96,
100 (1952).
50. Village of North Pelham v. Ohliger, 216 App. Div. 728, 214 N. Y. Supp. 253
(2d Dep't 1926), aff'd, 245 N. Y..593, 157 N. E. 871 (1927).
1. 3 Pownru, Rx s. PROPERTY § 405 (Cum. Supp. 1952) ; 5 &ESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 450 (1944).
2. J. C. Vereen & Sons v. Houser, 123 Fla. 641, 167 ,o. 45 (1936).
3. C. P. A. § 34. Before 1932, the period required was 20 years.
4. Scallon v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 185 N. Y. 359, 363, 78 N. E. 284, 285 (1906).
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Although the two doctrines have similarities, the differences
between easements and adverse possession decided the case of
Di Leo v. Pecksto Holding Corp.' Plaintiff in 1921 bought land,
accessible by traveling a path over defendant's lands. The plain-
tiff alone maintained this right of way, which his daily traffic
developed into a road. There were no objections until 1946 when
defendant entered into an agreement with neighboring land owners
to establish a new right of way which would have bisected and
interfered with plaintiff's accustomed route. Plaintiff brought an
action to establish his easement and to require removal of obstruc-
tions placed there by the defendant. In seeking to reverse the
lower court's judgment for the plaintiff, defendant maintained
that plaintiff did not satisfy the requirements of New York Civil
Practice Act § 40, which states, in effect, that to constitute adverse
possession, land is deemed possessed and occupied only where it
has been protected by a substantial enclosure or where it has been
usually cultivated or improved.
The court did admit that the doctrine of prescription will be
treated as the application to incorporeal rights of the statute of
limitations within the limits of the strong analogy between the
rules, citing Klin Co. v. N. . Rapid Transit Corp.,6 but recognized
that "differences between corporeal hereditaments and easements
prevent full application of the same rule in both cases.' '7 Where
an analogy exists, the statutory rules will be applied to easements,
but in this case, the conduct specified in the statute as essential
for acquiring land by adverse possession affords no analogy with
the kind of physical conduct prerequisite to gaining an easement
by prescription. Section 40 deals with the possession and occupa-
tion of land, but an easement or other corporeal right is not pos-
sessed or occupied. "An easement derives from use, and its owner
gains merely 'a limited use or enjoyment of the servient land.' "I
In short, the prescribed statutory manifestations of adverse pos-
session can have "no application to the case of an easement, as
of passage."' . As plaintiff and his predecessor had openly and
continuously used the right of way for more than the then required
twenty years, the court granted plaintiff a perpetual easement.
An action for specific performance of an alleged realty con-
tract for a perpetual easement gave the court an opportunity to
reiterate a settled rule of property law.'0  Plaintiffs performed
5:304 N. Y. 505, 109 N .E. 2d 600 (1952).
6. 271 N. Y. 376, 380, 3 N. E. 2d 516, 518 (1936). -
7. Id. at 379, 3 N. E 2d at 518.
8. At 109 N. E. 2d 602.
9. Colburn v. Marsh, 68 Hun 269, 272, 22 N. Y. Supp. 990, 992 (1893).
10. Grace Square Realty Corp. v. Choice Realty Corp., 154 East 97th St. Corp. v.
Schelberg, 305 N. Y. 271, 113 N. E. 2d 416 (1953).
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a number of acts which they maintained were part performance
of an alleged oral contract, sufficient to render the statute of frauds
inoperative. In return for the plaintiffs' landscaping the area
adjacent to their and defendants' buildings and developing a gar-
den project, defendants allegedly were to grant plaintiffs a per-
petual easement. The court cited Burns v. McCormick," contain-
ing the well-known opinion of Cardozo, which eloquently reaffirmed
the general rule: "There must be performance 'unequivocably
referable' to the agreement. . . 'An act which admits of explana-
tion without reference to the alleged oral contract or a contract of
the same general nature and purposes is not, in general, admitted
to constitute a part performance.' 12 What is done must itself
supply the key to what is promised. It is not enough that what
is promised may give significance to what is done." 13
The court said it knew of no authority holding that an oral
contract for a perpetual easement has been sufficiently performed
to authorize a decree of specific performance where the applicant
did not have possession, and where no improvements were made,
as was the case here. Notwithstanding, the court then referred
to the specific acts of the plaintiffs and said these acts did not
meet the above test. The plaintiffs' purchase of two adjoining
buildings from third persons, the gaining of possession of eight
apartments in one of them, the hiring of an architect to draw
plans for the garden project, consultation with their attorneys
relative to the preparation of formal grants, and even the regis-
tering of the trade name "Carnegie Gardens," the court said
could be interpreted as part performance of the alleged contract,
but "it is by no means the only reasonable explanation of those
acts and that is the test which must be satisfied."' 4
Collateral Attack
In Swindler v. Knocklong Corp.,5 defendant had acquired
title to land at a tax sale and was awarded judgment in a parti-
tion action he then brought against plaintiffs. Here, the plain-
tiffs, successors of the heirs of the record owner, brought this
action under Real Property Law, § 500, et seq., to set aside the
service in the latter action. Plaintiffs founded their claim on the
ground that service by publication in the partition action was
void since it was based on an affidavit that the heirs of the record
owner could not be found. Defendant's search only went as far
as the date of his filing lis pendens in that action. A more com-
11. 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1922).
12. Wooley v. Stewart, 222 N. Y. 347, 351, 118 N. E. 847, 848 (1918).
13. Burns v. McCormick, supra, at 232, 135 N. E. at 273.
14. 113 N. E. 2d at 421.
15. 305 N. Y. 527, 114 N. E. 2d 25 (1953).
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